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Essay 
ABOLISHING THE AMERICAN DEATH 
PENALTY:  THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION 
VERSUS THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The American death penalty is newly fragile.  About two decades ago, 
death sentences and executions reached their modern era highs and 
capital punishment seemed to be an entrenched part of the criminal justice 
system.  Thirty-eight states and the federal government had capital 
statutes on the books, and political actors at all levels seemed committed 
to accelerating executions.  Emblematic of this commitment was 
Congress’s passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996, which limited federal habeas corpus review of state and federal 
prisoners with the hope of reducing the time between sentence and 
execution.  But the last fifteen years or so have seen an extraordinary 
withering of the death penalty.1  Six jurisdictions have legislatively 
abandoned capital punishment, with several others on the cusp of doing 
so.  Executions have declined over seventy percent, from their 1999 high 
of ninety-eight to a low of twenty last year.2  Those executions are 
increasingly confined to a handful of states and to a handful of counties 
within those states.  Death sentences have dropped even more 
dramatically, from a high of 315 per year nationwide in 1996 to a low last 
year of 30—over a 90 percent decline.3  Other indications of the weakening 
of the death penalty abound.  Public support for the death penalty, as 
reflected in opinion polls, has declined substantially over the past twenty-
five years.4  At its recent convention in advance of the 2016 presidential 
election, the Democratic Party included abolition of the death penalty in 
                                                
* Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  Judge Robert M. Parker 
Endowed Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law.  This Essay is based on the Tabor 
Lecture given at Valparaiso University Law School. 
1 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
2 See Executions by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
executions-year [https://perma.cc/24DK-GAUY]. 
3 See Death Sentences by Year Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.death 
penaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-year-1977-present [https://perma.cc/2FUN-US3S]. 
4 See Death Penalty Trends, GALLUP INC., http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-
penalty.aspx [https://perma.cc/BT2B-S52A] (reflecting 60% support for death penalty for 
the crime of murder in October 2015, compared to 75–80% in the years 1988–1995). 
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the party platform for the first time.  Over the past several years, even 
some conservative, evangelical, and victims-advocate groups have voiced 
their opposition to capital punishment.5 
In light of these developments, the most apt questions surrounding 
the American death penalty seem to be when and how, rather than whether 
the death penalty will be abolished.  Given our federal structure, the only 
real prospect for nationwide abolition is a decision by the U.S. Supreme 
Court finding the practice unconstitutional.  Over four decades ago, the 
Court came close to ending the death penalty in 1972, when it found all 
prevailing statutes unconstitutional.6 Four years later, the Court upheld 
many new statutes passed in the wake of its decision.7  Since that time, the 
Court has developed a complicated series of doctrines regulating the 
operation of the American death penalty but has stopped short of finding 
the practice unconstitutional.  Increasingly though, Justices on the Court 
have indicated a willingness to revisit the broader issue of the 
constitutionality of the death penalty writ large.8 
What would constitutional abolition look like?  This Essay focuses on 
the surprising disconnect between some of the most powerful anti-death 
penalty arguments in the public arena and the arguments most likely to 
prevail in the Court.  Three central abolitionist arguments have had 
enormous traction among opponents of the death penalty, yet each has 
fared poorly in Supreme Court decisions and none are likely to provide a 
dispositive, independent basis for constitutional abolition going forward.  
The first of these arguments concerns racial discrimination in the 
administration of the American death penalty.  Concerns about racial 
discrimination were at the forefront of the efforts to regulate and restrict 
capital punishment in the 1960s, but the Supreme Court declined in 
numerous cases to hold that discriminatory application of capital 
punishment requires judicial intervention, much less abolition.9  
Constitutional abolition is thus unlikely to rest on the troubling and 
continuing role of race in the American capital system.  The second major 
ground of attack focuses on the problem of wrongful convictions and 
                                                
5 See CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH:  THE SUPREME COURT 
AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 215–16 (2016) (discussing opposition to the death penalty by 
George Will, murder victims’ families, Kansas college Republicans, and evangelical 
Christians). 
6 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). 
7 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (upholding Georgia’s guided 
discretion scheme). 
8 See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2795 (2015) (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
9 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The American Death Penalty and the (In)Visibility 
of Race, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 244 (2015) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Race]. 
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executions.  The discovery of numerous innocents on death row in the late 
1990s is often credited as a major turning point in the stability of the 
American death penalty, and concerns about wrongful convictions are 
perhaps the most frequently voiced grounds in contemporary public 
discourse for jettisoning capital punishment.  But the Supreme Court has 
rejected the idea that federal courts should police the accuracy of capital 
convictions, refusing to endorse the basic proposition that the 
Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted inmate who later 
uncovers evidence disproving or substantially undermining his or her 
guilt.10  The Court’s lack of solicitude for the claims of wrongfully 
condemned inmates suggests that the Court is unlikely to hold that 
inaccuracy in the capital system fatally undermines its constitutional 
status.  The third and most ubiquitous ground for attacking capital 
punishment rests on some version of human dignity.  Concerns about the 
inhumanity of the death penalty have dominated opposition to capital 
punishment since the Enlightenment era, both in the United States and 
around the world.  Opposition rooted in human dignity encompasses a 
number of related but distinct claims, including the assertion that capital 
punishment denies the worth of the individual, creates an unacceptable 
power in the State, treats offenders as means rather than ends, and 
imposes excessive suffering.  These types of attacks on the death penalty 
have been voiced throughout American history, from the earliest days of 
the anti-gallows movement to the advocacy of contemporary abolitionist 
groups, such as the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty.  
Arguments about human dignity provided the most important grounds 
for abolition in the vast majority of jurisdictions around the world that 
have jettisoned capital punishment, especially in Europe, and they remain 
the most compelling and salient bases for challenging the death penalty in 
continuing efforts to abolish it worldwide.  Claims of human dignity, 
though, have had far less traction in the U.S. courts, particularly the 
Supreme Court.  Although litigants in the 1960s and 1970s pressed the 
Court to find the death penalty violative of human dignity, the Court 
sidestepped such an approach and instead focused on the administration 
of the death penalty rather than its fundamental justice.  When it upheld 
new capital statutes in 1976, it declared that the choice to retain capital 
punishment belonged to the states, holding that the practice could be 
justified on retributive or deterrence grounds.  Since that time, the Court 
has scarcely mentioned claims of human dignity, even as it has faced 
challenges to dubious execution methods.  If the Court were to address 
and endorse a categorical challenge to the death penalty, it would be 
                                                
10 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). 
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unlikely to rest its case primarily on the intrinsic value of human life or 
the impermissibility of state involvement in killing. 
The first part of this Essay illustrates the ways in which concerns 
about racial discrimination, wrongful conviction, and human dignity have 
been marginalized within the Court’s extensive constitutional regulation 
of the death penalty.  The second portion traces the Court’s most likely 
path to constitutional abolition given prevailing capital jurisprudence and 
the subordinate—but still significant—role of such concerns within that 
jurisprudence. 
II. PATHS NOT TAKEN 
A. Racial Discrimination 
The American death penalty has always been tainted by racial 
discrimination.  In the antebellum South, the use of capital punishment 
was closely allied with the slave economy that had been established in the 
colonial era.11  Capital offenses included crimes against slavery, such as 
encouraging slaves to escape or rise up against their masters.  Execution 
methods employed against slaves were particularly gruesome, mirroring 
the especially harsh treatment reserved for those convicted of treason in 
England and elsewhere given the existential threat posed by such 
offending.12  Southern capital codes made the availability of the death 
penalty turn on the racial characteristics or slave status of the offender and 
victim.13  South Carolina, for example, made it a capital crime for slaves to 
maim or even “bruise” a white person.  In the antebellum period, race and 
capital punishment were mutually reinforcing, in that race influenced the 
administration of the death penalty and the death penalty helped cement 
and give significance to racial identity. 
After the Civil War, the explicit use of race in state capital statutes 
disappeared, but racial discrimination permeated every aspect of capital 
proceedings, from the initial criminal investigation (including methods 
used to elicit confessions), to charging decisions, jury selection, 
appointment of defense counsel, presentation of evidence, prosecutorial 
tactics, sentencing proceedings, appeals, and the availability of clemency.  
In addition, antagonism toward the newly-freed black population 
produced a generation of extra-legal executions in the form of lynching.  
More blacks were lynched in the two decades spanning 1885-1905 (close 
to 2,000) than the total number of persons executed in the United States 
                                                
11 See Steiker & Steiker, Race, supra note 9, at 245. 
12 See id. at 246. 
13 See id. at 248. 
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over the past fifty years (approaching 1,500).14  As lynching declined by 
the late 1920s, executions climbed.  The summary legal proceedings 
afforded black defendants in capital cases earned the sobriquet “legal 
lynching.”  Many capital trials in the South were conducted without even 
a pretense of fairness, in some cases with a mob at the courthouse steps or 
even in the courtroom itself.  The discriminatory administration of the 
death penalty was perhaps most evident in capital rape cases.  An 
overwhelming percentage of those sentenced and executed for rape in the 
twentieth century were black defendants convicted of raping white 
victims; all such executions after the 1920s were confined to southern 
states and the District of Columbia.15 
By the 1960s, concerns about racial discrimination were a central part 
of the critique of the American death penalty.  In 1963, when three Justices 
on the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time suggested that the death 
penalty might be constitutionally excessive as applied to certain offenders, 
they chose rape cases from the South in which blacks had been sentenced 
to die for the rape of white victims.16  Justice Arthur Goldberg, writing a 
dissent from the Court’s decision to deny certiorari, suggested that the 
Court should decide whether the death penalty is disproportionate for the 
offense of rape.  The original draft of Goldberg’s dissent highlighted the 
manifest racial discrimination in such cases, but at the urging of Chief 
Justice Earl Warren, his discussion of race was omitted in his published 
opinion.17  That opinion nonetheless triggered the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) Legal Defense Fund 
(“LDF”) to include abolition of capital punishment as part of its ongoing 
portfolio of racial justice causes, alongside its efforts to desegregate 
schools, end discrimination in housing and employment, and ensure 
voting opportunities.  Over the next decades, the LDF invested enormous 
resources in capital litigation, becoming the most prominent abolitionist 
group in the United States.  The LDF began its efforts by commissioning 
empirical research to document the role of race in Southern rape cases.  By 
the late 1960s, the LDF had successfully pursued a moratorium strategy 
that brought executions in the United States to a halt and set the stage for 
the Supreme Court to address the constitutionality of the death penalty. 
                                                
14 See Classroom:  Lynchings, by Year and Race, 1882–1968, CHARLES CHESTNUT DIGITAL 
ARCHIVE, http://www.chesnuttarchive.org/classroom/lynching_table_year.html 
[https://perma.cc/GP9K-75WA]. 
15 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF PRISONS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, BULLETIN 
NO. 45, Capital Punishment 1930-1968 (1969). 
16 See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889 (1963). 
17 See EVAN MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE:  THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 28-29 (2013). 
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Despite longstanding concerns about racial discrimination in the 
administration of the death penalty and the efforts of the LDF and others 
to highlight such discrimination in litigation, the Supreme Court avoided 
addressing racial discrimination as a basis for restricting the death 
penalty.  In the mid-1960s, the Court declined to review a challenge to the 
death penalty resting on the LDF’s empirical study showing a powerful 
linkage between race and the death penalty in rape cases.18  When the 
Court invalidated prevailing statutes in Furman v. Georgia in 1972, the 
Justices supporting that result tended to highlight general “arbitrariness” 
rather than racial discrimination.  In 1977, when the Court found the death 
penalty excessive as applied to rape, it chose the (rare) case of a white 
offender who had been sentenced to death and said nothing about the role 
of racial discrimination in such cases.19 
In 1987, in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court finally addressed directly the 
claim that the racially discriminatory operation of the death penalty 
violates the Constitution.20  The death-sentenced inmate presented a 
sophisticated statistical analysis, the Baldus study, which found that race 
played a significant role in capital outcomes in post-Furman Georgia, 
particularly the race of victims.  The Court assumed for purposes of 
decision that the study was sound.  Yet the Court declined to give relief, 
holding that the defendant could not rely on evidence of systematic racial 
discrimination and instead must offer proof of discrimination in his own 
case.21  The Court indicated that allowing such statistical evidence to 
provide the basis of a constitutional claim would open the door to 
challenges based on other types of discrimination; it also suggested that it 
could not confine a decision granting relief to capital defendants and that 
a ruling for McCleskey would therefore threaten the operation of the 
entire criminal justice system.22 
The Court’s rejection of systemic racial discrimination as grounds for 
challenging capital punishment makes it unlikely that the Court would 
frame constitutional abolition primarily in such terms.  The unlikeliness 
of race-based abolition is reflected and reinforced by the appearance of a 
case on the Court’s docket this Term.  In Buck v. Davis, the Court refused 
to allow a capital sentence to stand where defense counsel put on an expert 
who indicated that the defendant was more likely to be dangerous because 
                                                
18 See Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 267 (1970) (limiting grant of certiorari to claims 
regarding standardless discretion and the unitary structure of the capital trial and refusing 
to accept review of the racial discrimination claim). 
19 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977). 
20 See 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987). 
21 See id. at 292. 
22 See id. at 314–17. 
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he is black.23  That such a question remained open to argument in 2016 
suggests how far the Court is from finding racial discrimination as a basis 
for wholesale constitutional rejection of capital punishment. 
The Court’s reluctance to focus on race in its capital jurisprudence 
stems from several considerations.  First, the Court faces the problem of 
measuring the impact of race on the capital system and deciding how 
much impact is constitutionally intolerable.  In Justice Lewis Powell’s 
initial draft of the majority opinion in McCleskey, he criticized the Baldus 
study and left open the possibility that a more persuasive empirical 
demonstration of racial bias might require judicial relief.  Justice Antonin 
Scalia objected to this approach, wanting to avoid endless litigation 
involving sophisticated studies beyond the grasp of most lawyers and 
judges.24  The McCleskey litigation reveals the institutional limits of courts 
in understanding, distilling, and applying the results of social science in 
constitutional litigation.  Moreover, even when courts are able to 
confidently assess the impact of race on capital decision-making, it 
remains difficult for those courts to determine when a state system has 
crossed the constitutional line.  States likely will vary in the extent to 
which racial discrimination infects capital decision-making.  If systemic 
racial discrimination is a cognizable claim, courts will have to develop 
manageable, non-arbitrary standards for assessing such claims.  Studies 
confined geographically to one jurisdiction (or a small number of 
jurisdictions), or temporally to a particular span of time, are unlikely to 
provide the Court sufficient grounds for permanent abolition throughout 
the United States. 
Second and relatedly, the Court is much more comfortable regulating 
criminal justice procedures than criminal justice outcomes.  The Court can 
encourage or require states to adopt safeguards to minimize the impact of 
racial discrimination (such as policing the use of racially discriminatory 
strikes in jury selection), but the Court does not have the tools to ensure 
equal outcomes.  Moreover, in McCleskey, the Court highlighted the fact 
that one of the important safeguards in capital cases—the ability of juries 
to reject the death penalty based on mitigating circumstances—actually 
undercuts the equality of outcomes, because a commitment to discretion 
in capital cases entails the possibility that such discretion will be exercised 
in arbitrary or invidious ways.25 
                                                
23 Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. _____ (2017). 
24 Justice Antonin Scalia, Memorandum to the Conference Re: No. 84-6811-McCleskey v. 
Kemp (Jan. 6, 1987), available at Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers, McCleskey 
v. Kemp file (“Memorandum from Scalia”). 
25 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 302–03. 
Steiker and Steiker: Abolishing the American Death Penalty: The Court of Public Opinio
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017
586 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51 
Third, the Court has been loath to treat racial discrimination as 
beyond repair in other constitutional contexts.  In its desegregation and 
affirmative action cases, the Court emphasized that remedies should be 
structured with an end date in mind, in part based on the Court’s belief 
that racial discrimination is surmountable.26  Given this confidence in the 
eventual decline in the effects of past discrimination, the Court is unlikely 
to throw up its hands and declare the death penalty unconstitutional 
based on evidence of lingering racial discrimination in capital cases.  Such 
a concession in the capital context would have destabilizing consequences 
for its broader approach to racial discrimination in other contexts, many 
of which have a greater pull on the Court’s attention and resources. 
Finally, the remedy of abolition appears to be ill-suited to the problem 
of racial discrimination that the Baldus study and other studies have 
identified.  The most pronounced manifestation of racial discrimination in 
Georgia was the unwillingness of prosecutors and jurors to seek or return 
capital verdicts in minority victim cases.  This sort of under-enforcement 
would be most naturally addressed by increasing capital prosecutions in 
such circumstances; abolition would not necessarily increase solicitude for 
minority victims or rectify the imbalanced response to their victimization. 
Thus, even though racial discrimination has been and remains a 
ubiquitous problem in the administration of the death penalty and 
concerns about racial discrimination motivated the campaign to restrict 
capital punishment both within and outside of the Court, the Court is 
unlikely to abolish the death penalty primarily on such grounds.  The 
Court’s decisions provide extremely limited tools for attacking capital 
punishment as racially discriminatory, and the Court has said remarkably 
little about race and the death penalty despite abundant opportunities to 
do so. 
B. Wrongful Convictions 
Fear of executing innocents is likely as old as the death penalty itself.  
Many abolitionist jurisdictions around the world, including Great Britain, 
were motivated to abolish in part by high-profile wrongful convictions 
and/or executions.27  In the United States, concerns about innocence have 
surfaced at various times with various levels of urgency.  The late 1990s 
marked the beginning of an era of unprecedented anxiety about the 
problem of wrongful convictions.  Technological advances in DNA 
analysis made it possible to assess scores of cases with preserved DNA, 
                                                
26 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (asserting that affirmative action 
should no longer be necessary in university admissions decisions in twenty-five years). 
27 See ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY:  A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 
54–55 (5th ed. 2015). 
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and the results were disheartening.  Testing revealed numerous 
wrongfully convicted inmates in both capital and non-capital cases.  A 
new cottage industry of “innocence projects” emerged to revisit 
convictions with the benefit of new technology as well as new insights into 
the factors leading to wrongful conviction. 
The most troubling spate of exonerations occurred in Illinois, with the 
discovery of more than a dozen wrongfully condemned men on a death 
row that housed fewer than 200 inmates.  The Illinois experience triggered 
intensive media coverage of the “exoneration” phenomenon and deeper 
examination of the causes of inaccurate verdicts.  One predictable source 
of error was police and/or prosecutorial misconduct, but studies also 
revealed endemic problems with evidence long regarded as reliable, at 
least by the public at large:  eyewitness testimony and confessions.  The 
experience in Illinois led Republican Governor George Ryan to declare a 
moratorium on executions in 2000 based on his “grave concerns about our 
state’s shameful record of convicting innocent people and putting them 
on death row.”28  The moratorium was followed three years later by 
Governor Ryan’s grant of mass clemency to everyone on death row and 
eleven years later by Illinois’s decision to abolish the death penalty. 
Concerns about wrongful convictions have contributed substantially 
to the decline in the American death penalty over the past fifteen years.  
The issue was central in the debates culminating in the legislative repeal 
of capital statutes in New Jersey, New Mexico, Illinois, Connecticut, 
Maryland, and Nebraska (whose capital statute was reinstated by 
referendum in November of 2016).  Many observers also credit concerns 
about innocence with contributing substantially to the remarkable decline 
in death sentences—from over 300 a year in the mid-1990s to just 30 in the 
most recent year. 
But the resonance of concerns about innocence with the general public 
is not reflected in prevailing constitutional doctrine.  For the past fifty 
years, the Supreme Court has extensively regulated state criminal 
processes.  The Court has applied against the states virtually all of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights concerning the investigation and 
prosecution of a crime, including the prohibition of unreasonable searches 
and seizures, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right against 
compelled self-incrimination, the right to counsel, the right to a jury trial, 
and the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.  All of these 
guarantees were designed to constrain the federal government, but the 
                                                
28 Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on Executions, Will Appoint Commission to Review 
Capital Punishment System, ILL. GOV’T NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 31, 2000), 
http://www3.illinois.gov/PressReleases/showpressrelease.cfm?subjectid=3&recnum=359 
[https://perma.cc/4QZC-P6BR]. 
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Court held in a series of cases that these protections were essential aspects 
of due process secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore 
applicable against state criminal justice actors.29  As a result of these 
decisions, federal courts routinely address claims that state police or 
prosecutors have violated basic procedural protections. 
Despite the enormous expansion of federal constitutional protections 
in state criminal cases, the Court has declined to provide any specific 
protection for inmates who claim to have suffered wrongful conviction 
apart from the minimal requirement that the evidence at trial be sufficient 
to establish all elements of the convicted offense.  In 1993, the issue came 
to the Court in a stark fashion, when Leonel Herrera, a Texas death-
sentenced inmate, presented new evidence that his brother had committed 
the offense for which Herrera had been sentenced to die.30  Under Texas 
law, such evidence had to be presented within thirty days of trial, and 
after that period, an inmate was forever barred from claiming wrongful 
conviction in court.  Because Herrera’s evidence came outside that 
deadline, the state court refused even to look at the evidence or consider 
the claim.  When Herrera filed a federal habeas corpus petition claiming 
that Texas had violated the Constitution by not considering his new 
evidence, the lower federal courts held that claims of “bare-innocence”—
resting on newly-discovered evidence of innocence without evidence of a 
separate constitutional violation, such as prosecutorial misconduct—are 
not cognizable in federal court.  The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to address 
Herrera’s claim but ultimately withheld relief, suggesting strongly that 
claims of wrongful conviction should be directed not to the courts but to 
executive clemency.  The Court declined to decide whether, as Herrera 
provocatively framed the question for review, the Constitution prohibits 
the execution of an innocent person.31 
More than two decades post-Herrera, the Court has yet to embrace the 
proposition that a condemned inmate with newly-discovered, airtight 
evidence of his innocence has a constitutional right to judicial relief.  Given 
the Court’s reticence to embrace this basic claim of an individual who 
asserts his innocence based on new evidence, it is unsurprising that courts 
have been unreceptive to the much broader assertion that the general 
unreliability of the death penalty is a reason to condemn the punishment 
in all cases.  One exception, coming on the heels of the experience in 
Illinois, was the decision of a federal judge in 2002 to invalidate the federal 
death penalty based on an intolerable risk of wrongful conviction and 
                                                
29 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 147–48 (1968). 
30 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393 (1993). 
31 See id. at 398. 
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execution.32  The opinion, citing the recent spate of exonerations, declared 
that “[w]e now know, in a way almost unthinkable even a decade ago, that 
our system of criminal justice, for all its protections, is sufficiently fallible 
that innocent people are convicted of capital crimes with some 
frequency.”33  The opinion suggested that the death penalty cut off the 
possibility of discovering and vindicating claims of actual innocence.  But 
that decision was promptly reversed, with the federal appellate court 
noting that nothing in the Court’s jurisprudence suggested a 
constitutional right “to a continued opportunity for exoneration 
throughout the course of one’s natural life.”34 
What accounts for the courts’ unwillingness to transform concern 
about erroneous convictions and executions into a cognizable 
constitutional claim?  One threshold problem is defining what counts as a 
wrongful conviction.  Is a conviction “wrongful” if later evidence simply 
undermines proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?  Under that 
approach, an inmate would be deemed “wrongfully convicted” even if it 
were more likely than not that he was in fact guilty, so long as new 
evidence creates at least some reasonable doubt.  Or should “wrongful 
conviction” attach only to cases in which an inmate affirmatively 
establishes his innocence?  The absence of an agreed-upon sense of 
wrongful conviction undermines the possibility of consensus about the 
magnitude of the phenomenon. 
To structure an opinion around the prevalence of wrongful 
convictions, courts would have to resolve this definitional problem.  They 
would also face the near-impossible task of gathering usable data of error 
rates in capital cases.  Such an undertaking would require deciding the 
appropriate jurisdictional focus:  should courts look at error at the county 
level, state level, or national level?  Even if a court could surmount these 
obstacles—deciding what counts as a wrongful execution, amassing data 
appropriate to the definition, and choosing the governmental unit to be 
assessed—it would then have to determine how much error is 
constitutionally intolerable.  As in the racial discrimination context 
described above, courts would face the complicated (and perhaps 
unseemly) job of quantifying constitutionally acceptable rates of error (if, 
say, a one percent error rate were operative and acceptable, we would 
expect to have had fifteen or so wrongful executions since executions 
resumed in 1977). 
Apart from these practical problems, a claim centered on the risk of 
wrongful execution raises conceptual problems as well.  Why is wrongful 
                                                
32 See United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
33 Id. at 420. 
34 United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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execution worse than wrongful incarceration?  Many people argue that 
errors can be discovered and corrected if an inmate is sentenced to lengthy 
incarceration, but there are reasons to believe that errors are more likely 
to be detected in cases where an inmate is sentenced to death.  Non-capital 
inmates ordinarily have no right to counsel in state or federal post-
conviction proceedings, whereas capital inmates are generally afforded 
such representation.  An unrepresented innocent inmate is unlikely to 
exert the legal and political pressure necessary to overturn or commute 
his sentence.  The high visibility of capital cases also makes it much more 
likely that media will be drawn to claims of innocence asserted by death-
sentenced inmates.  Hence, even though executed inmates lose their 
opportunity for vindication once executed, their pre-execution 
opportunities for vindication are generally vastly superior to their non-
capital counterparts, which suggests that their overall chance of 
vindication might be more substantial. 
Along similar lines, the notion that errors are “irrevocable” in death 
cases but fixable on the non-capital side rests on the implausible 
assumption that incarcerated inmates can be made whole in the rare cases 
where their innocence is uncovered and vindicated.  Time lost during 
wrongful incarceration is not recoverable.  An inmate who spends twenty-
five years wrongfully imprisoned can have some semblance of a life after 
vindication, but the wrongful punishment he or she endured cannot be 
undone. 
More broadly, the Court’s reluctance to construct a constitutional 
jurisprudence responsive to the problems of wrongful conviction and 
execution reflects the distinctively American preoccupation with 
procedural rather than substantive justice.  Wrongful conviction in the 
United States means conviction in violation of the rules, not innocence of 
the underlying offense.  The American attraction to procedural justice is 
rooted in part in the Constitution itself, which speaks in terms of due 
process and prohibits certain practices rather than guarantees substantive 
justice (apart, perhaps, from the prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishments).  The American adversarial system is premised on the 
notion that substantive justice is achieved when zealous advocates for the 
state and the defendant fairly present their sides in court.  The use of lay 
jurors, the exclusion of relevant evidence obtained in violation of 
constitutional rules, and the circumscribed review of jury verdicts all 
reveal the limited commitment to accuracy in trial outcomes as opposed to 
the robust commitment to fair competition in court.  This longstanding 
commitment to proceduralism in American criminal justice explains the 
unwillingness of the Court in Herrera to constitutionalize a right to be free 
from execution if new evidence suggests innocence.  It also portends the 
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limited prospects for constitutional abolition of the death penalty resting 
on the risk of wrongful execution. 
C. Human Dignity 
Throughout American history, opponents of the American death 
penalty have offered numerous critiques regarding its wisdom as public 
policy.  During the era of public executions, critics cited the coarsening 
effects of such spectacles.  In later years, opponents pointed to the absence 
of proven deterrent effects, its arbitrary and discriminatory 
implementation, and the risk of error.  More recently, opponents tend to 
highlight the increased financial costs associated with capital punishment, 
which vastly exceed the cost of non-capital proceedings (even when 
combined with the cost of lengthy—even lifetime—incarceration).  
Despite the ubiquity of these pragmatic challenges, one suspects that the 
opposition of those most committed to abolition rests on concerns about 
the fundamental morality of the practice—separate and apart from 
deficiencies in its administration.  Some base their moral objections to 
capital punishment on religious grounds, such as Quakers and Catholics.  
Since the founding, many of those who oppose the death penalty on 
secular grounds have deemed it inconsistent with human dignity.  The 
claim from human dignity appears in many forms, including the claim 
that capital punishment denies the humanity or redemptive capacity of 
the offender, constitutes excessive cruelty, is incompatible with 
democracy, or establishes an inappropriate relation between state and 
citizen.  Outside of the United States, the argument based on human 
dignity is by far the most commonly invoked ground for opposing capital 
punishment, both in countries that have abolished it and in those on the 
brink of abolition.  In the contemporary abolition movement, the 
arguments from religion and human dignity are often complementary, as 
reflected in the Vatican’s declaration that the death penalty is “an affront 
to human dignity.”35 
Despite the prominence of the human dignity argument among 
ardent abolitionists both here and abroad, the argument has been largely 
absent in most American constitutional discourse.  In the few cases 
challenging capital practices that made their way to the Supreme Court in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which focused primarily on 
particular methods of execution, the Court ruled that capital punishment 
was not cruel in the constitutional sense so long as it did not involve 
                                                
35 See Vatican Says Death Penalty is “Affront to Human Dignity,” DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 
(Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/vatican-says-death-penalty-affront-
human-dignity [https://perma.cc/43Y4-G6R4.]. 
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“something more than the mere extinguishment of life.”36  Even when an 
inmate complained that it was constitutionally excessive to electrocute 
him a second time after the first attempted electrocution failed, the Court 
refused to intervene, stating that “[a]ccidents happen for which no man is 
to blame,” and “[t]he traditional humanity of modern Anglo–American 
law” forbids only “unnecessary pain in the execution of the death 
sentence.”37 
When the Court addressed the claim in Furman v. Georgia that capital 
punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment, the Justices focused on the administration of the death 
penalty rather than its moral acceptability.  Only Justice William Brennan 
insisted that the death penalty violates human dignity, asserting that 
capital punishment necessarily involves the state in the “denial of the 
executed person’s humanity.”38  His colleagues, on the other hand, 
directed their energies toward pragmatic considerations such as 
deterrence, cost, error, and arbitrariness.  Even Justice Thurgood Marshall, 
who agreed with Justice Brennan that the death penalty should be deemed 
unconstitutional in all cases, emphasized instrumental concerns such as 
the lack of proven deterrent effect, the low recidivism rate of convicted 
murderers, the cost, and the brutalization effects of executions.39 
When the Court upheld several capital statutes four years later, the 
Court seemed to reject the notion that capital punishment is incompatible 
with human dignity, holding that it can be justified on retributive or 
deterrence grounds.40  Over the forty ensuing years, the debates about 
capital punishment at the Court have focused almost exclusively on 
pragmatic considerations, ranging from the adequacy of aggravating 
factors, the ability of jurors to consider mitigating evidence, the 
competence of trial counsel, discrimination in jury selection, and so on.  
Occasionally in dissent, a Justice has noted the inhumanity of execution 
methods or death–row confinement,41 but no member of the Court since 
Justice Brennan has offered a sustained attack on capital punishment as 
inconsistent with human dignity.  Justice Stephen Breyer, who penned the 
most comprehensive recent challenge to the American death penalty in 
                                                
36 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 426, 447 (1890). 
37 Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462–63 (1947). 
38 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
39 See id. at 362–63 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
40 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183–87 (1976). 
41 See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2797 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing 
effects of long-term solitary confinement on death row);  Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 123 (2008) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing for constitutional protection in the lethal injection process 
to ensure an inmate is unconscious so as to avoid risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary 
pain). 
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Glossip v. Gross, adhered to the largely instrumental critique of the 
American practice, emphasizing its lack of reliability, arbitrariness in 
administration, long delays between sentence and execution, and 
declining use.42  Given the virtually complete absence of judicial focus on 
human dignity in its hundreds of opinions addressing capital punishment 
(including dissents), the Court is unlikely to reject the death penalty 
primarily on such grounds. 
The paucity of attention to human dignity concerns in capital 
punishment discourse in the American courts stems from several factors.  
As noted above, many of the protections in our Constitution are 
procedural in nature.  Even the Eighth Amendment provision regarding 
“cruel” punishments requires that such punishments also be “unusual” to 
be forbidden.  Contrast, in this regard, France’s Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen, drafted at roughly the same time, which includes the 
pronouncement that “[t]he law ought to establish only penalties that are 
strictly and obviously necessary.”43  The American constitutional tradition 
scarcely mentions human dignity in many contexts where we might 
expect to find such references, including cases involving freedom of 
speech, freedom of religion, and racial justice.  Only recently, in the 
Court’s cases prohibiting the criminalization of homosexual sodomy and 
sustaining the right of marriage for gay couples, does the Court appear to 
invoke human dignity as a primary ground for decision.44 
More recent national constitutions, especially those framed after the 
horrors of the Holocaust or apartheid, explicitly protect human dignity 
and/or human life, providing a constitutional basis for abolition of the 
death penalty even when there is no specific provision on the subject.  In 
addition, political alliances, like the European Union, reinforce human 
dignity as a central political commitment, whereas the U.S. Supreme 
Court has tended to interpret constitutional commitments to personal 
liberty in a somewhat idiosyncratic and isolated manner (although, as 
discussed below, this isolated approach is diminishing in the capital 
context). 
The unavailability of human dignity as a constitutional argument 
likely also contributed to the capital litigation strategy pursued in the 
                                                
42 See 135 S. Ct. at 2755–56 (2015) (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
43 Bill Stuntz powerfully contrasts the American constitutional focus on procedural 
protections with the more robust substantive guarantees of the roughly contemporaneous 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.  WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 76 (2011). 
44 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (holding that the prohibition on 
same-sex marriage “demeans gays and lesbians”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003) 
(“The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private 
sexual conduct a crime.”). 
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1960s and 1970s.  When the NAACP LDF formulated its attack on the 
American death penalty, it decided to attack particular vulnerable 
practices, such as death–qualified juries, wide discretion in capital 
sentencing, and unitary sentencing procedures, rather than seeking 
judicial condemnation of the death penalty as fundamentally unjust in the 
abstract.  Even when the LDF took the next step in challenging the 
constitutionality of the death penalty as a whole, it emphasized aspects of 
its administration rather than its inconsistency with human dignity.  The 
Court, in turn, framed its constitutional regulation in light of these 
challenges, focusing exclusively on state death penalty practices rather 
than the death penalty itself.  The limited protection for human dignity in 
the American constitutional tradition and the resulting strategic choices in 
capital litigation created a path of dependence in which the American 
death penalty continues to be contested on pragmatic, instrumental 
grounds.  Moreover, the Court’s resolutely pragmatic focus has likely 
influenced death penalty discourse in the public sphere, marginalizing 
further death penalty opposition rooted in deontological principle. 
Outside of the Court, opponents of the death penalty have submerged 
absolutist arguments against the death penalty to find common ground 
with potential allies who do not share their foundational moral objections.  
Such opponents have recast efforts to eliminate the death penalty as 
“repeals” rather than “abolition” to avoid the moralism associated with 
the latter.  It is much easier to find common ground around issues of 
wrongful conviction and cost than around the much more fraught 
culture–war question whether states ought to be allowed to execute 
heinous offenders.  The United States has thus become an outlier beyond 
its mere retention of the death penalty; it is an outlier in the diminishing 
visibility of human dignity as a basis for death penalty opposition both on 
and off the Court. 
III.  THE PATH TO CONSTITUTIONAL ABOLITION 
Although arguments about race, innocence, and human dignity will 
not likely provide a direct constitutional route to abolition of the death 
penalty, they may nonetheless play a significant supporting role in what 
we predict is the most likely path to constitutional invalidation of capital 
punishment.  The constitutional doctrine that the Supreme Court has 
elaborated to address “excessive” or “disproportionate” punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment is the most likely legal vehicle to lead to a 
categorical constitutional abolition for a variety of reasons.  This doctrine 
is long–established and well–elaborated, and it has been used by the Court 
recently in a series of cases yielding significant limitations on both the 
death penalty and the sentence of life-without-parole.  Moreover, Justice 
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Anthony Kennedy, who has been a key swing vote on the Court, authored 
several of these recent opinions elaborating the Eighth Amendment’s 
proportionality principle.  Finally, the Court’s proportionality doctrine is 
capacious in terms of the kinds of evidence and arguments that it 
encompasses, creating room for concerns about race, innocence, and 
human dignity to play a supporting role in evaluating the constitutionality 
of challenged punishment practices. 
The Court’s proportionality doctrine had an early start, with its 
essential outlines sketched in Gregg, the case that reinstated the death 
penalty just four years after the Court had invalidated all prevailing 
capital statutes in 1972 in the landmark Furman decision.45  In Gregg, the 
Court explained that the Eighth Amendment prohibition of “cruel and 
unusual punishments” requires consideration of whether a challenged 
practice violates “the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”46  This latter phrase does not by its terms 
offer much helpful direction, but the Gregg Court began to identify the 
relevant criteria for gauging “evolving standards of decency.”  First, the 
Court looked to legislative enactments, noting that thirty–five states and 
the federal government had enacted new death penalty statutes since 
1972.  The Court also considered the outcomes of individual sentencing 
hearings, noting that more than 450 death sentences had been imposed 
under the new statutes.  In addition to this quantifiable evidence of 
contemporary standards, the Court addressed what it identified as the 
twin purposes of capital punishment—deterrence and retribution—and 
concluded that these purposes could plausibly be served by reinstating 
the practice of capital punishment under the revised statutory schemes. 
Since 1976, the Court has increasingly fleshed out its Eighth 
Amendment analysis, striking down both capital and non-capital 
sentences that the Court found to violate “evolving standards of decency.”  
Just one year after Gregg, the Court invalidated the death penalty for the 
crime of the rape of an adult woman as “grossly disproportionate and 
excessive punishment” for such a crime.47  Once again, the Court started 
with consideration of legislative enactments and jury verdicts, which 
together constituted “objective evidence of the country’s present 
judgment concerning the acceptability of death as a penalty.”48  Georgia 
was the only state that authorized the death penalty for the crime of rape, 
and its juries had returned relatively few death sentences for rapists in the 
years prior to the Court’s decision.  But once again, the Court did not 
                                                
45 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 154. 
46 Id. at 173 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).  
47  See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
48 Id. at 593. 
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restrict its analysis to quantitative evidence, explaining that “the 
Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be 
brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty 
under the Eighth Amendment.”49  By “our own judgment,” the Court was 
not suggesting that the Justices invoke their own moral or policy 
preferences, but rather that they consider—as they had done in Gregg—
whether the challenged practice promoted the deterrent and retributive 
purposes of capital punishment.  The Court concluded that death was a 
disproportionate punishment for someone who had not taken a life 
because such a sentence ran afoul of the basic retributive command of 
proportionality. 
The Court applied the same reasoning to strike down the death 
penalty for defendants convicted of felony murder for killings that they 
personally did not commit or assist or intend to take place, but rather that 
were committed by a codefendant in a joint felony.50  The Court later 
restricted its felony-murder exemption to those defendants who played 
only a minor role in the criminal undertaking or who lacked reckless 
disregard for the possibility that life might be taken.51  In both of its 
decisions regarding the death penalty for felony murder, the Court 
performed the same two–step analysis outlined above:  (1) it considered 
“objective evidence” of society’s views such as legislative enactments and 
jury verdicts; and (2) it consulted its “own judgment” by considering 
whether the purposes of deterrence and retribution were served by the 
practice in question. 
For a period of almost two decades, from the mid-1980s until the early 
2000s, the Court did not strike down any punishment practices under the 
Eighth Amendment, and indeed, it rejected two challenges to the death 
penalty brought by juvenile offenders and offenders with intellectual 
disability in 1989.52  It seemed to many that the Court’s proportionality 
doctrine had hit a wall beyond which it might not progress further.  But 
starting in 2002, the doctrine took on new life and momentum as the Court 
used it five times in a ten–year period to limit the reach of both the death 
penalty and the sentence of life–without–parole.  In this series of five 
cases, the Court entrenched and elaborated its Eighth Amendment 
doctrine, expounding upon—and expanding—the evidence relevant to 
discerning “evolving standards of decency.” 
                                                
49 Id. at 597. 
50 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982). 
51 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 137 (1987). 
52 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 336–37 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 
368 (1989). 
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In its 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court struck down the 
death penalty for offenders with an intellectual disability.53  In this case, 
the objective evidence was not nearly so stark as it had been with regard 
to the death penalty for rape.  Twenty of the thirty-eight states that 
authorized the death penalty permitted the execution of offenders with an 
intellectual disability, while only eighteen prohibited it.  The Court 
nonetheless found a legislative consensus against the practice by adding 
the twelve abolitionist states to the count, thus yielding a legislative 
majority of thirty states rejecting the practice, with only twenty states 
accepting it.  But the Court noted that even on the “objective” side of its 
analysis, raw numbers did not rule; rather, the Court explained, “[i]t is not 
so much the number of [states exempting offenders with an intellectual 
disability] that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of 
change.”54  It was significant to the Court that sixteen of the eighteen states 
that prohibited the execution of offenders with intellectual disabilities had 
done so within the thirteen years prior to the Court’s decision and that no 
state had withdrawn such an exemption in the same period.  Thus, the 
Court’s objective analysis looks to recent history and emerging trends, not 
only to legislative head counts. 
Moreover, the Atkins Court offered an even more expansive 
elaboration of its objective analysis by considering, albeit in a footnote, 
evidence of “a much broader social and professional consensus.”55  The 
Court explained that its conclusion about national consensus was 
supported by the views of expert organizations, representatives of diverse 
religious communities, the world community, and the general public 
(expressed through polling data).  The Court’s willingness to consult such 
a wide variety of sources to establish whether a societal consensus had 
emerged was a game-changing moment in Eighth Amendment law.  No 
longer was the “objective evidence” of “evolving standards of decency” 
primarily grounded in legislative nose counting.  Rather, such evidence 
was qualitative as well as quantitative.  The significance of this analytical 
shift was reflected in the vehemence of the dissent it engendered.  Justice 
Scalia was scathing in his repudiation of the Court’s analysis, even 
bestowing upon it a sarcastic award:  “[T]he Prize for the Court’s Most 
Feeble Effort to fabricate ‘national consensus’ must go to its appeal 
(deservedly relegated to a footnote) to the views of assorted professional 
and religious organizations, members of the so-called ‘world community,’ 
and respondents to opinion polls.”56 
                                                
53 See 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002). 
54 Id. at 344. 
55 Id. at 316 n.21. 
56 Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Objective evidence aside, the Atkins Court also found that its own 
judgment called for an exemption from the death penalty for offenders 
with intellectual disabilities, because such offenders were less culpable for 
their offenses and less likely to be deterred.  In bringing its own judgment 
to bear, the Court also emphasized a wholly new consideration:  it noted 
that offenders with intellectual disabilities in the aggregate “face a special 
risk of wrongful execution” because of their susceptibility to giving false 
confessions, their lessened ability to consult with counsel, their possibly 
inappropriate affect at trial, and the risk that juries will consider them 
more dangerous because of their disability.  For the first time, concerns 
about innocence became an explicit part of the Court’s proportionality 
analysis. 
Three years later, the Court—per Justice Anthony Kennedy—
underscored the expansive approach it had adopted in Atkins when it 
struck down the death penalty for juvenile offenders in Roper v. Simmons 
in 2005.57  Expert opinion was the centerpiece of the Simmons Court’s 
analysis, as the Court emphasized the wealth of scientific and sociological 
studies that revealed how different adolescents are from adults in terms 
of maturity, self-control, and susceptibility to peer influences, and how 
much more transitory and less fixed is the adolescent personality.  The 
Court explained that these proven qualities of youth make juvenile 
offenders less culpable for their offenses (thus undermining the goal of 
retribution) and make it less likely that juveniles can be deterred by the 
threat of a death sentence (thus undermining the goal of deterrence).  The 
Court also took the occasion to give full-throated voice to the significance 
of the views of the world community.  Justice Kennedy forcefully and 
dramatically emphasized the appropriateness of consulting the 
experience and views of other nations:  “It does not lessen our fidelity to 
the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express 
affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples 
simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own 
heritage of freedom.”58 
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court again three years later when the 
Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional for the crime of raping 
a child in Kennedy v. Louisiana in 2008.59  The objective evidence of 
consensus against the use of capital punishment in this context was strong, 
given that only a handful of states had passed laws punishing child rape 
with death, and Louisiana was the only one that had actually sentenced 
anyone to death for such a crime since 1964.  Although the case would 
                                                
57 See 543 U.S. 551, 563–64 (2005). 
58 Id. at 578. 
59 See 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 3 [2017], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss3/3
2017] Death Penalty Abolition 599 
have been easy to dispose of on the objective numbers alone, the Court 
spoke more broadly, explaining that death is an excessive punishment for 
any interpersonal crime that does not involve the taking of life, simply as 
a matter of retributive justice.  Moreover, the Court again adverted to the 
problem of innocence, noting “serious systemic concerns in prosecuting 
child rape,” including the documented problem of unreliable child 
testimony, which can create a “special risk of wrongful execution.”60  The 
Kennedy Court introduced yet another concern regarding the extension of 
the death penalty to the crime of child rape, observing that sentencing 
juries would have little guidance in choosing the few cases deserving of 
death from the regrettably large numbers of rape cases involving child 
victims.  As a result, explained the Court, “we have no confidence that the 
imposition of the death penalty would not be so arbitrary as to be 
“freakis[h].”61  The Court made no specific mention of the possibility of 
racial discrimination, even though the issue had been raised extensively 
in the briefing of the case.  But the Court’s use of the word “freakish” and 
accompanying citation to Furman constituted a strong gesture in that 
direction.  The Furman Court’s use of words like “freakish,” “wanton,” 
and “arbitrary” were widely read as code for the risk of racial 
discrimination; at the time of the decision, “everyone understood Furman 
as having been about race.”62 
The Court’s commitment to its Eighth Amendment proportionality 
doctrine is illustrated by the extension and further elaboration of that 
doctrine in the noncapital context.  The Court used the principles that it 
developed in the series of capital cases described above to limit the 
imposition of the noncapital sentence of life-without-parole (“LWOP”) on 
juvenile offenders.  In Graham v. Florida, the Court constitutionally barred 
the imposition of LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders who had 
committed nonhomicide offenses.63  The Court held that its 
proportionality doctrine, although developed in the context of capital 
cases, is the proper legal rubric for consideration of all “categorical” 
Eighth Amendment claims—that is, for Eighth Amendment challenges to 
a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders.  In 
addition to its detailed consideration of objective evidence such as 
legislative authorization and actual sentences imposed, the Court 
emphasized the special status of youth, reiterating its analysis from Roper 
                                                
60 Id. at 443. 
61 Id. (citing Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Furman). 
62 MANDERY, supra note 17, at 276. 
63 See 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).  The Court extended its holding in Graham two years later, 
holding that juvenile homicide offenders could not receive mandatory life-without-parole 
(“LWOP”) sentences.  See Miller v. Alabama, 132, S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
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v. Simmons, the case outlawing the juvenile death penalty.64  Also 
consistent with its approach in Simmons, the Court underscored the 
significance of world opinion, noting, “the United States is the only Nation 
that imposes life without parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders.”65 
The Graham Court also drew on the part of its analysis in Kennedy v. 
Louisiana that had raised concerns about “freakish” application of the 
death penalty in the context of child rape in light of the broad discretion 
afforded capital sentencing juries.  Raising a similar concern about 
accuracy in LWOP sentencing, the Graham Court explained that a 
categorical rule exempting juveniles from LWOP sentences in non-
homicide cases was necessary because decision-making in this context is 
too potentially arbitrary, allowing the imposition of an LWOP sentence on 
a juvenile “[b]ased only on a discretionary, subjective judgment by a judge 
or jury that the offender is irredeemably depraved.”66  The Court 
concluded:  “A categorical rule avoids the risk that . . . a court or jury will 
erroneously conclude that a particular juvenile is sufficiently culpable to 
deserve life without parole for a nonhomicide.”67  Although the Court did 
not explicitly raise the issue of racial discrimination (though here, too, it 
was extensively briefed), the Court’s concern that discretionary judgments 
about “depravity” might be unreliable implicitly speaks to concerns about 
discrimination. 
The hundreds of pages of Supreme Court opinions elaborating the 
Eighth Amendment’s proportionality doctrine have transformed what 
might have remained a largely quantitative analysis of consensus-by-
numbers into a much broader, more qualitative assessment of emerging 
societal trends.  This doctrine is not a likely vehicle for claims of factual 
innocence, challenges to racial discrimination, or elaboration of the 
meaning of human dignity.  Nonetheless, there is room in the newly 
capacious proportionality analysis for consideration of each of these 
disparate issues, and thus each may play a role in a future global challenge 
to capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 
The objective, quantitative evidence of a growing consensus against 
the death penalty is becoming stronger with each passing year.  In the past 
decade, six states have repealed their death penalty laws, a rate that is 
unprecedented in recent history.  Moreover, in the past two years, two 
state supreme courts have declared their state’s death penalties 
unconstitutional, bringing the number of states without death penalty 
                                                
64 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 91–92. 
65 Id. at 81. 
66 Id. at 77. 
67 Id. at 78–79. 
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statutes to nineteen, with another eleven states reaching essentially “de 
facto abolitionist” status, having not performed any executions in a 
decade.68  Even more striking is the decline in use of the death penalty on 
the ground, with both executions and new death sentences falling off 
dramatically from late 1990s highs.  While this powerful quantitative case 
for an emerging consensus against capital punishment in America will no 
doubt be the starting point for an Eighth Amendment categorical 
challenge to the death penalty, the constitutional analysis will not end 
there, as the Court has repeatedly emphasized that other considerations 
are relevant to the question.  Concerns about race, innocence, and human 
dignity all can be addressed within this broader analysis. 
Although the Court has declined to expressly invoke concerns about 
racial discrimination in its Eighth Amendment analysis, there are two 
ways in which such concerns may yet play a part in an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to the death penalty.  First, as noted above, the Court has 
repeatedly raised concerns about “freakish” or “erroneous” sentencing 
determinations arising from inadequately fettered discretion.  In both 
Kennedy and Graham, these concerns played an explicit part in the Court’s 
Eighth Amendment invalidation of the challenged sentences (the death 
penalty for child rape in Kennedy and LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders in Graham).  Evidence of racially discriminatory patterns in 
capital sentencing thus may be relevant to a constitutional challenge to 
capital punishment—not to “prove” intentional discrimination in a 
particular case (proof that was required and not found by the Court in 
McCleskey), but rather to demonstrate the inadequacy of the capital justice 
system’s constraints on sentencing discretion.69  Second, when the Court 
brings its “own judgment” to bear as part of its Eighth Amendment 
analysis, it asks whether the practice at issue serves the purposes of 
retribution or deterrence.  If death sentences are meted out on the basis or 
arbitrary or invidious characteristics of the offender (like race or ethnicity), 
then by definition, the death penalty is not being imposed according to 
offenders’ just desserts, and thus runs afoul of the core principle of 
retributive justice.  Evidence of racially discriminatory patterns in capital 
sentencing is directly relevant to whether the death penalty meets 
retributive goals as practiced, rather than in abstract theory. 
                                                
68 In his 2015 dissent in Glossip v. Gross, Justice Breyer counted eleven states as de facto 
abolitionist because they had not conducted executions in more than eight years.  Ten of 
those eleven states remain abolitionist today.  One of those states, Arkansas, has since 
resumed executions, but the de facto abolitionist count remains at eleven because Nebraska, 
which Justice Breyer treated as a seventh repeal jurisdiction, reinstated its death penalty but 
has not conducted an execution in two decades.  See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2773, 
2778 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
69 See 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987). 
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The Supreme Court has been reluctant to authorize a federal judicial 
forum for death row inmates to bring individual claims of factual 
innocence based on new evidence discovered after trial.70  But the Court 
has been quite willing to raise concerns about innocence in bringing its 
“own judgment” to bear on the constitutionality of challenged death 
penalty practices.  It has raised concerns about the potential for wrongful 
conviction of offenders with intellectual disabilities because of the 
difficulties their disabilities raise in the investigation and trial contexts.  
Similarly, it has raised concerns about the potential wrongful conviction 
of offenders charged with child rape because of the unreliability of child 
testimony.  In this way, evidence of a heightened risk of wrongful 
convictions in capital cases, which has been documented by scholars, may 
play a significant role in the Court’s evaluation of the constitutionality of 
the death penalty, wholly apart from the Court’s analysis of the objective 
evidence of its declining use.  But innocence may also come into play on 
the objective side of the Court’s analysis, because concerns about 
innocence have been one of the most powerful forces driving both the 
legislative repeal movement and the declining use of the death penalty on 
the ground.71  Innocence thus explains the dramatic decline in the raw 
numbers and suggests that this decline is not a temporary blip but rather 
an enduring feature of the landscape of capital punishment. 
Finally, there is also a role for invocations of human dignity in the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis.  At a semantic level, the Court has 
frequently intoned, “The basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”72  At a realpolitik 
level, Justice Kennedy has shown great interest in the concept of dignity, 
raising it in contexts as diverse as same-sex marriage and restrictions on 
abortion rights.73  Given the results of the 2016 election and the 
confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch, it is unclear whether or for how long 
Justice Kennedy will continue to play a role as swing Justice on the Court.  
But concerns about dignity may enter the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
analysis in yet a different way.  The Court has reiterated, first in a footnote 
in Atkins and then in the text of both Simmons and Graham, that the views 
of the world community play a role in establishing an emerging Eighth 
                                                
70 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). 
71  See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in 
Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469 (1996); Richard C. Dieter, Innocence and the Death Penalty: 
The Increasing Danger of Executing the Innocent, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (1997), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/523?scid=45&did=292 [https://perma.cc/X2JB-
6HHA]. 
72 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
73 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 
157 (2007). 
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Amendment consensus.  The fact that all of our peer countries—all of the 
other Western democracies—have abolished capital punishment, and for 
quite some time now, is thus undeniably relevant to the Court’s 
consideration of the objective evidence of consensus.  While the views of 
other nations are not dispositive of the Eighth Amendment question, the 
Court has maintained that a uniform perspective abroad “underscores” 
the centrality of certain rights in our own constitutional system.  Our 
closest peers in the world—the countries of Western Europe—abolished 
capital punishment not for the pragmatic reasons that now dominate the 
American debate (e.g., discrimination, innocence, cost), but rather 
primarily on grounds of human dignity, which plays a much greater role 
in European criminal justice discourse than in our own.74  Thus, concerns 
about human dignity may be smuggled onto less hospitable American soil 
through consideration of the views of our European peers. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The issues that any concerned citizen would raise about the American 
death penalty are not the same issues that the U.S. Supreme Court will 
most likely address under the Constitution in response to a categorical 
challenge to capital punishment.  Nonetheless, concerns about racial 
discrimination, innocence, and respect for human dignity can and likely 
will play a role, albeit a supporting and/or indirect one, in the Eighth 
Amendment rubric that the Court will most likely bring to bear on the 
question.  At a broader level, however, these concerns will come into play 
in an atmospheric as well as an analytic fashion.  Should the U.S. Supreme 
Court take up a categorical Eighth Amendment challenge to capital 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, the real question will be 
whether the Court’s forty-year project to regulate and rationalize the most 
extreme penal sanction under the Constitution has succeeded (well 
enough) or failed. By raising the issues of discrimination, innocence, and 
dignity, litigants will essentially be arguing that the regulatory project has 
failed—and, indeed, was perhaps an impossible mission from the very 
start. 
                                                
74 Cf. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE:  CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING 
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 207 (2003). 
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